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ABSTRACT
Ireland experienced rapid economic growth between 1994 and 2004. This economic performance
prompted the Economist magazine to coin the phrase ‘The Celtic Tiger’ to describe the Irish
experience. However, during the ‘boom period’ banks did not have enough funds from deposits
and had to rely on the inter-bank market for funds. Consequently with the collapse of the subprime market and the global banking crisis, the banking systems reliance on inter-bank lending
resulted in toxic property and construction loans. In essence the property/construction bubble
burst, the banks are broke and there is a need to rescue them. The government’s solution is to
take these ‘toxic’ assets off the banks balance sheets via the National Asset Management Agency
(NAMA).
This paper investigates the potential costs/benefits of NAMA, the mechanics of its workings, the
alternative proposals and the lessons that can be learned from the Irish experience.
CONTEXT
The Irish economy experienced rapid growth rates from 1994 to 2007. Average growth rate since
1994 was three to four times the average for the EU and the OECD and recorded even higher
growth rates than the Korean economy. The characteristics of this growth were rapid growth in
exports which far exceed the EU and the OECD averages. In addition sustained domestic
demand was a multiple of the OECD and EU average (Arrow, 2000). Interestingly, all of this
occurred despite a reduction in government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. A key feature is
that growth was achieved simultaneously with low inflation. In 1981 Ireland’s inflation rate was
20% while during the boom inflation rates average circa 2.5%. Since all variations in living
standards are attributable to differences in countries’ productivity (Mankiew, 2001), Irish living
standards were driven by fast productivity growth without a comparable increase in wages.
(Krugman, 2000). The rate of wage increases was less than the rate of increase in profits.
The role of past investments in education created a stock of labour force skills which was one of
the advantages that Ireland had in attracting foreign direct investments (FDI). The role of FDI is
at the heart of understanding the Irish economic miracle. Ireland had favourable ratings in terms
of labour markets, corporate taxation and exchange rate policy. FDI was 50% higher per capita

in Ireland than the UK and six times higher than France and Germany. An explanation for
Ireland’s success in attracting FDI suggests that the way nations’ trade tilted the geographical
balance in favour of Ireland (Krugman, 2000). Transportation costs became less important than
they used to be compared to delivery time, communications and personal contact. Ireland’s
insular location was no longer a problem leading to significant gains in value to weight ratios.
The role of convergence - how lower income economies can grow more rapidly than richer
economies - is useful in explaining Ireland’s performance. For Sachs, lagging economies ‘catch
up’ through the “importation of technology and capital and through high returns on domestic
investments” (Sachs, 2001, P. 54). Furthermore, the source of Irish growth has been linked to EU
subsidies (Fuente, and Vives 2000) although this particular explanation has been over stated.
FROM BOOM TO BUST
The OECD’s grouping of thirty economically advanced nations have undergone the most severe
recessions since World War 2, with Ireland suffering the most acute contraction of all with GNP
falling by 13.5% from peak (Larkin, 2009). The origins of Ireland’s crises are multifarious.
Larkin suggests the primary causes are macroeconomic imbalances, particularly in housing.
National average house prices rose from €75,000 in 1996 to €287,664 in December 2006. This is
a nominal increase of 283%, with the capital city Dublin experiencing a rise of circa 366% in the
same period (Global Property Guide, 2010). The macroeconomic drivers of this growth in
property prices were the rapid growth in GDP which averaged 9.8% between 1995 and 2000.
The housing boom was assisted by mortgage market deregulation and by the entry of foreign
banks and significantly by housing equity withdrawal. In 1990 Ireland’s per capita income was
about 75% of the EU average. In 2007, according to the OECD, Ireland was the most prosperous
country in Europe apart from Luxembourg Since 2007 Ireland’s “resources per head have been
reduced to – but not below – those of the rest of Western Europe” (Fitzgerald, 2010). The boom
to burst in housing has seen investment in housing fall by more than half with both private and
public sector incomes adjusting accordingly. This adjustment has been necessary because during
the period of prosperity Ireland lost the principle driver of the boom – productivity. Our cost
base in terms of wages, salaries, bonuses and other input costs ran far beyond the sustainable
capacity of any European country (Fitzgerald, 2010). Once the global banking crisis emerged
this loss in productivity led to the collapse of the Irish economy.
The origin of the banking crisis was the sub-prime mortgage market in the U.S. In their efforts to
clean up banks’ balance sheets of these very risk sub-prime loans, collateralized debt obligation
managers packaged these loans and sold them to financial institutions world wide. Ironically
Irish banks were not exposed in any meaningful way to those securities. During the ‘boom
period’ Irish banks did not have enough funds from deposits and had to rely on the inter-bank
market to borrow the funds they needed in order to lend. According to the Irish Central Bank
‘net foreign liabilities’ of commercial banks in Ireland (a proxy for bank borrowing from other
banks and the international market) rose from 10% of GDP in 2002 to 60% of GDP in 2007.
With the collapse of the sub prime market and the onset of the credit crisis, banks became
unwilling to lend to each other because of fears of the quality of their loan books and the fear
that they would not get their money back. The end game came when Lehman Brothers collapsed
and inter bank flows of funds completely dried up. In essence the property bubble had burst, and
banks needed to be rescued. Banks are indispensible to the efficient functioning of the economy.

They are unable to carry out their normal functions (e.g. providing lines of credit to individuals
and business) because they are underfunded. They are rationing credit because they do not have
enough funds. The Irish government’s solution is to take these ‘toxic’ assets off the banks
balance sheets via the National Asset Management Agency.
THE NATIONAL ASSET MANAGEMENT AGENCY (NAMA)
NAMA is established as an asset management company that will acquire ‘good’ and ‘bad’ loans
from the financial institutions and can hold those assets, dispose of them, or indeed develop them
over a ten year time frame. NAMA is buying loans at a discount (average 50%) from
participating institutions. It will operate like a bank because it will have the same “rights to
pursue the debts” (www.nama.ie). The price paid is based on the current market value at the time
of valuation adjusted for its long term economic value (LTEV). The intellectual justification for
applying LTEV is provided by (among others) William Isaac who headed the US Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation during the financial crisis of the 1980s. According to Isaac, assets
should be valued not on the basis of their current value but on their anticipated cashflow
(Maister, 2009). The LTEV will be significantly lower than the outstanding loan given to the
borrower who will be pursued to the full amount.
The NAMA discount or “haircut” refers to the discount that is applied to the loans that NAMA is
buying. The actual discount depends on the quality of the underlying asset secured with the loan.
NAMA will pay for these loans by issuing guaranteed government securities that will pay a
floating rate of interest. The Department of Finance and the National Treasury Management
Agency estimate 40% of the loans being taken over are paying interest at on average 3.5%
variable (NAMA is talking over ‘good’ loans as well as ‘bad’ loans). The interest paid by the
government on these bonds issued to the banks will be 1.5%. The book value of the loans been
transferred is €80billion (www.nama.ie). Income from loans will accrue to NAMA and the
taxpayer and where a borrower defaults the subsequent sale proceeds will accrue through NAMA
to the taxpayer. If NAMA makes a loss over its lifetime a levy will be applied to the banks. The
procedure for borrowers (once their loans have been acquired) is to submit a detailed 3 year plan
to NAMA which in turn will assess the plan’s viability. Where business plans are not considered
viable a statutory receiver may be appointed.

The NAMA route is to force banks to take losses on loans now and not over time and this will
start the recovery quickly. The quicker this is done the more likely it is that lenders and investors
will supply capital to banks because of the reduced risk. This is one of the advantages that
NAMA has over nationalization which requires a restructuring, reorganization and a subsequent
reflotation. The time dimension is important because the life-blood of business is liquidity.
VALUATION OF LOANS
Much of the debate surrounds the valuation of the loans that NAMA will buy. Proponents of
NAMA say that the State won’t pay anything to banks. Instead it will issue them with IOUs
(bonds) which the banks can sell to the European Central Bank (ECB) in exchange for cash. But

if the properties are disposed at a price less than their long term economic value it will mean a
transfer of wealth from taxpayers to banks.
However, proponents suggest that NAMA is likely to generate surplus cash for the taxpayer and
at worse break-even. But NAMA or indeed any other solution will only work if policies designed
to boost the economy’s competitiveness are undertaken at the same time. By applying realistic
long term economic valuations on these properties, disposal by NAMA in the future would be
enough to pay off the bonds in full (and possibly make a profit). It is also worth noting that circa
20% of the loans relate to foreign property mostly in the UK where the indications are that
recovery has started.
Although it is difficult to come up with a figure for the possible drop in values, for illustrative
purposes lets assume the government has put 47% on peak-to-trough and because NAMA will
dispose of properties over time the appropriate valuation is long term economic value. For
example, a book value of €68bn and a loan to value ratio of 77% gives the underlying properties
a valuation of €88billion at their peak. Giving a 47% drop in value from peak to trough implies
an underlying value of €47bn. Adding to this the estimated €9bn in long term economic value
NAMA will pay €54bn - a write down of 30% on the loans (Power, 2010)
This process, may understate the value of the properties because it assumes that all properties
were bought in the boom (Ahearne, 2009). So, as an example, suppose that an asset was bought,
say 10 years ago for €100 with a loan of €77. Ten years on at its peak this asset would be valued
at, say, €300. A 47% drop in value now would imply a valuation of €159 on a loan of €77. Given
the 30% write down on loans, NAMA will purchase this loan for €54 which has an underlying
value of €159 (Power 2010).

TEMPORARY NATIONALISATION
A proposed alternative to NAMA was full temporary nationalization. Under this proposal all
Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank shares would be bought by the state at a price which will
be determined by the level of bad debts. All bank loans would then be transferred to a proposed
Asset Recovery Trust at ‘current market value’. Banks would then be ‘reorganised’ and at some
stage in the future their shares would be re-floated. In addition, there would be a ‘re-negotiation’
with existing bond holders. In other words, it is proposed to swap the banks debt for equity. The
argument for a re-negotiation with bond holders is based on the unfairness of asking the
taxpayers to guarantee bondholders who receive higher returns to take on the risk of possible
default. Even allowing for a debt:equity swap, it is likely that the banks would need further
capitalization by the state, i.e. nationalization (a wipe-out of shareholders) and removing the
banks from the stock market.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
In September 2008 when the government was faced with an institutional run on deposits from
Anglo Irish Bank it responded by guaranteeing all liabilities, except equity holders (deposits and
bank bondholders). So, any attempt at a debt:equity swap would effectively mean a default and a

possible flight away from risks associated with Irish government denominated debt (and
therefore a complete collapse of public services) or at least a significant increase in the marginal
cost of government bonds.
A research report by Bloxham stockbrokers concludes that shifting all banks liabilities onto the
balance sheet of the state (nationalization) should be avoided at all costs. This, they suggest,
would have serious implications for the country’s ability to fund its own borrowing
requirements. “The full nationalization solution to the crises would cost the taxpayer upwards of
€21billion” (Bloxham 2010). So it is not just the value of NAMA bonds that need to be
considered, it is all government bonds.
In addition, opponents of nationalisation say that it ignores the inherent value that a stock market
listing has in terms of the information it provides to investors. Staying private provides
information that is valuable and has a positive influence on the investors who provide funds to
listed companies.
Because it is meant to be a ‘temporary’ nationalization, re-flotation will mean (sometime in the
future) the government, ironically, will have to identify ways of establishing the true long term
value of the shares (a process that everybody agrees is difficult). In order to incentivize potential
investors to buy these shares, they will have to be sold at a discount, which effectively means
transferring some taxpayers’ wealth to private individuals.
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that banks will lend to the domestic market and will instead
lend to overseas markets or just sit on the cash. So the NAMA option won’t necessarily solve the
banks’ liquidity problem.
Furthermore the value of NAMA bonds combined with annual budget deficits could triple
national debt. Because households recognize that high deficits will mean higher taxes in the
future they increase their savings thus reducing their demand further and thus prolonging the
recession.
However, the cost to the taxpayer of nationalization could be more pronounced.
Whatever option is taken the opportunity cost to the state is vast. Imagine the actual returns that
could be made, at little or not risk, if circa €50 billion of government bonds were issued to invest
in the long term improvement in the education system, the improvement of the nation’s health
and the public services generally.

CONCLUSIONS
Ronald Regan once quipped that if the game of trivial pursuit was invented for economists it
would have a hundred questions and a thousand answers. The debate on how to deal with the
toxic property assets of banks provoked a furious debate. In general, economists disagree
because they differ in terms of their scientific and value judgments. Economics is no different to
other sciences in this respect. For example, meteorologists have debated whether the earth is
experiencing global warming. The truth is out there and scientists can disagree about the
direction in which truth lies (Mankiew, 2001). Economists can disagree for the same reason.

For Irish policy makers, Nama will cost money but in terms of the alternatives it will be the least
costly to the taxpayer. Any attempt at a debt:equity swap would risk a flight away from Irish
government denominated debt and with loan to deposit ratios ranging from 150% to 300% there
would be a massive deleveraging of the system and a collapse of GDP. A default would lead to
distressed selling of property, distressed fall in prices and a collapse of the economy. This is the
classic debt deflation scenario. Therefore the NAMA solution is not a ‘sop’ to bondholders but
an effort to prevent a complete collapse of the economy. Full nationalisation risks a sovereign
debt default.
The approach taken by the government is seen as key for bondholders, key for investment,
consumer confidence and expectations. NAMA provides stability to the banking sector and
cleans up their balance sheets and buys time for an orderly return to property markets. Without a
properly functioning banking system there cannot be a properly functioning property market.
The size of the Irish banking loan book to GDP is far greater than was the case in Sweden,
Finland, and Japan during their banking crisis. Therefore the potential cost of nationalising Irish
banks is far greater to Ireland’s debt raising capacity than in previous cases. Rather than moral
hazard, NAMA acts as a buffer against the recognition of lumping all banks liabilities onto
national balance sheet. Nevertheless banks face considerable difficulties particularly in terms of
capitalisation. Banks will recapitalise themselves – keeping them private has an inherent value.
These options will work once the economy recovers from recession. Lack of Credit is not
uncommon in a recession. What NAMA has done is put banks back into an area where loan
deposit ratios are at (normal) 125-130%. Will this mean that banks will provide credit? Not
necessarily but it does create the commercial conditions where it is possible to start lending.
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